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Abstract 
The central claim of this paper is that contemporary project management is practiced within the constraint of a single 
archetype, that of the 'scientific' project manager, and identification with that archetype has been a limiting factor in 
the development of project management as a sophisticated human practice. This paper argues for the inclusion of 
alternative disciplines within the over-all project management framework, and suggests philosophical hermeneutics 
as one such approach. Richard Rorty’s particular pragmatic variation of the philosophic hermeneutic, which he calls 
‘ironism’, is offered as the most suitable with which to support the practice of project management. Rorty’s ironism is 
found to be mirrored in the everyday activities of project managers in the field via a series of phenomenological 
interviews. Through their own voices, project managers demonstrate that much of what they practice could already be 
considered ‘ironic’, yet are unable to articulate this aspect of their practice within existing, formal project 
management methodology. The result of this is significant disruption to the meaning project managers are able to 
derive from their work, and the results they are able to achieve. In advocating ironism, this paper does not seek to 
replace the corpus of formal project management theory, but rather to highlight its shortcomings and in so doing 
contributes to the expansion of the methods at the project manager’s disposal.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper will explore Richard Rorty’s (1979) philosophical hermeneutic approach of ironism in the 
context of project management. In doing so it will contribute to the argument that project management, 
whilst currently viewed as an abstract and universal method requiring the application of discrete technical 
knowledge, is in fact a highly practical and situated activity (Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2001; 
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Thomas, 2006). This paper will present Rorty’s ironism as one such approach, arguing his central thesis 
of “wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation” (Rorty, 1979:378) is emblematic of the 
way in which expert project managers operate once they have left behind the strictures of formal project 
management theory. Leveraging the work of Thomas (2006), Cicmil (2006) and Flyvbjerg (2001) 
amongst others, this paper will first seek to problematize the discipline of formal project management as 
it is currently theorised and practiced. The following section will then elaborate Richard Rorty’s (1979) 
philosophical hermeneutic of ironism, arguing the linguistic nature of our understanding justifies an 
approach to practice based in narrative interpretation and redescription. The final section will highlight, 
through a brief examination of the narratives of two project manager practitioners, the ways in which 
ironism can contribute to the day-to-day practice of project management. 
2. Problematizing Project Management 
Since its theoretical conception over 50 years ago, project management has become one of the 
dominant practices within which work effort is organised and directed in an organisational context 
(Thomas, 2006). Lewis (1999) estimates that over 50% of human activity within organisations is now 
done under the auspices of a project. Numerous professional bodies devoting themselves to this field have 
emerged, principle among them (by membership base at least) the Project Management Institute, which 
boasts over 600,000 members in over 185 countries (www.pmi.org accessed: June 10th 2012). Despite 
this, project management has consistently failed to deliver the results demanded by its own formal frame 
of reference i.e. within the constraints of time, cost and specification (Hartley, 2009; Kerzner, 2001; 
Lewis, 1999). The fact that project managers continue to utilize the tools and techniques of this method, 
in spite of its failings, suggests that existing formal project management methodology is now accepted as 
‘the’ way in which projects are delivered rather than as simply one method amongst others (Ackroyd, 
1994).  
Heerwagen (2010) observes that unlike the workforce of the 1960’s, today’s workers operate in an 
organizational context of reduced hierarchical structures, blurred boundaries between different 
departments and job categories, and a continual cycle of reorganization interspersed with brief periods of 
stability. A typical worker in the 1960’s would have experienced a far higher degree of direction from 
immediate superiors, been part of much more departmentalized and rigid structure and had a far higher 
average period of tenure at a single organization (Heerwagen, 2010). Likewise, a Gartner report at the 
Content and Collaboration Summit 2010 notes that today’s worker is increasingly exposed to a range of 
work practices that would have been relatively unfamiliar to a worker of the 1960’s. The fundamental 
paradox in the conceptualisation of formal project management appears to be that projects are constituted 
for the purpose of delivering change within a disembodied, disenfranchised and semi-structureless 
corporate world, whilst at the same time utilizing a paradigm cherished for its predictive capacity. As 
Thomas puts it “it is past time to rethink project management taking a critical view of its underlying 
assumptions. Problematizing the concept is a starting point for developing a different fundamental 
understanding of the functions of projects in organisations.” (Thomas, 2006:105) The following section 
provides a brief outline of one such possible alternative understanding in the form of Richard Rorty’s 
ironism. 
3. Rorty’s Ironism 
In “Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature” (1979) Rorty outlines a criticism of the foundations of the 
narrative framework that we, in the 21st century, have inherited. Rorty’s central contention is that, 
courtesy of Enlightenment philosophers, we have embedded in our culture a number of dominating 
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metaphors that have, without suitable questioning, been allowed to overshadow large areas of activity in 
the natural and human sciences. The essence of Rorty’s position is that epistemology and the sciences 
underpinned by it are just another social tradition, and he grants science no special status for accessing 
eternal truths (Rorty, 1979). Rejecting the metaphysical underpinnings of our language enables us to 
ignore the accuracy or otherwise of our description of things, for an attention to how well such 
descriptions enable us to deal with those things. If a particular description does not work for us then a 
new description is required.  
Rorty describes this particular attitude towards our language as 'ironism'. An ironist is someone who 
acknowledges the contingent nature of our language and therefore acknowledges the descriptive terms 
with which we outline our needs, morality and values could just as easily have been something else 
(Elshtain, 2003). There is no historical force of progress or conformance to reality to suggest our current 
language is necessarily better than any that has passed, or will be necessarily worse than any to come 
(Rorty, 1989). The ironist, therefore, does not share the metaphysician’s final stance towards their 
vocabulary. They remain acutely aware of the contingencies of their language, cognizant that the terms 
they have available to express their deepest fears and darkest desires gain meaning from their relationship 
to other terms but not to anything that stands outside of language, such as intuition or greater purpose, 
that corresponds to 'the truth' (Bernstein, 2003). Terms invested in notions of 'truth' are simply ways of 
saying 'stop talking about it'. The ironist sees other languages as offering further opportunities for self-
exploration, without seeing any as offering a more accurate description of their reality, only a more useful 
one (Rorty, 1989).  
What matters for the ironist is that a vocabulary has provided her with all the necessary tools for her 
project of self-creation, a project Rorty calls redescription. As Rorty puts it, "anything can be made to 
look good or bad by being redescribed" (Rorty, 1979:379-389) He explains redescription as the "project 
of self-creation through the imposition of one's own idiosyncratic metaphoric" (1989:140) Language, for 
Rorty, consists entirely of terms in a transition between one of two states: metaphor and dead metaphor 
(or literalness). A metaphor is simply the use of old words in unfamiliar ways, and it is the unfamiliarity 
of the usage that gives the expression its transformational power. Sometimes the new, unfamiliar 
expression catches on and falls into general use. The expression becomes a familiar one and the 
metaphorical nature of it dies. It is now literal or 'dead' (Guignon & Riley, 2003). Ironism stands as the 
recognition of the metaphorical nature of our language and the ever-present possibility of redescription 
(Frazier, 2006). The disruptive effect of using old terms in new and unfamiliar ways is what the ironist 
seeks and sees as necessary in her personal projects of self-creation. Frazier calls redescription the 
"engine of self-creation" and sees Rorty's ironist as wanting to "relate autonomously to their inherited 
vocabularies" by "getting out from under them" (2006:462). Rorty's notion of self is therefore the product 
of the vocabulary we have available to us through chance, and we are free to play with that vocabulary. 
The alternative is to see some expressions in our vocabulary as permanently fixed and constant, as 
cohering to something outside of language and making a redescription of it nonsensical (Williams, 2003). 
The refusal to accept such expressions as only metaphors is to submit to a “final vocabulary” about which 
no further discussion can take place (Rorty, 1991:160-163). 
4. Phenomenological Research and the Project 
The application of Rorty’s ironism to project management practice will be explored utilising a 
phenomenological research method. The particular research method chosen is derived from the work of 
Todres (2007) who outlines three 'remedies' offered by phenomenological research; (1) a concern for the 
human order with a language to support it, (2) the grounding of research in lived experience, and (3) 
variable research results that open up possibilities rather than closes them down with answers. One of the 
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key devices used to help accomplish this is the interview, the purpose of which is to “understand the 
experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience.” (Seidman, 1991) Unlike 
quantitative information gathering, the interviewer is an adaptable instrument, capable of responding in a 
multitude of ways to the data that he or she gathers and then re-framing the following question to suit. It 
is a continual interplay as the familiarity of the researched is challenged by the questions of the 
researcher, whose research in turn is rendered unfamiliar as the responses to their questions move them 
down hitherto unconsidered lines of enquiry (Arnold & Fischer, 1994). Ultimately, the aim of the 
interview and the outcome of a phenomenological study is to “describe the meaning of the lived 
experiences for several individuals about a concept or the phenomenon” (Seidman, 1991). 
5. The Ironic Project Manager 
In talking about the 18 month long project to deliver an on-line messaging and collaboration project 
for his client, Peter outlines how the biggest challenge was not the logistics or technical demands of the 
deployment, but over-coming resistance to the extreme changes in the work environment the new system 
engendered: 
There were all these new terms we had to float around like ‘workgroup collaboration’, ‘instant 
messaging’ and ‘multi-authoring’. This was all describing the new way people were going to be 
working using the new tools we were giving them. They’d gotten new IT before, but it was always 
kind of linear, you know, more of the same except a little bit faster with more features and used 
exactly the same way. This time they had to change the way they practiced their work. 
One particular feature of the system Peter was introducing was described in the product literature as 
‘multi-authoring’. This feature allowed a single document to be accessed and worked on by any number 
of people at the same time from anywhere in the world. The system automatically kept track of the 
changes so there was only ever a single document, whilst everyone could see who was making the 
changes and could comment on or accept or reject what had been done. Apart from an improvement in 
productivity, the new system was also meant to lower storage costs by reducing the vast numbers of 
copies of documents in existence as a result of the same document being emailed between people for 
revision and review. As Peter discovered during initial piloting though, people simply refused to use the 
new system the way it had been designed:  
Despite all the training we gave them, they [the end-users] were still working on documents 
individually and then emailing it to each other for their turn, same as they always had. We were 
getting none of the benefits we had planned. When we talked to some of the users about this we 
discovered a real mind-set around the word ‘authoring’. Authoring implied ownership and people 
did not want that ownership of ‘their’ document shared amongst the group. It might have been a 
document about a quarter percentage movement in fuel costs or something, but they had crafted it 
themselves.  
In Heideggerian terms, the people in Peter’s project were experiencing a state of disruption and were 
now acutely aware of a tool whose use would ordinarily have passed without notice (Heidegger, 1996). 
The reluctance to embrace the new ‘multi-authoring’ tool could be an example of what Segal (1999) 
describes as a ‘defensive’ response to disruption. This defensiveness is captured by Peter with the word 
‘mind-set’. The problem with a tool, as Segal notes, is generally not the tool itself, but the particular way 
in which the tool relates to a set of practices (Segal, 1999). At a purely functional level, Peter’s project 
was implementing a word processor, which is simply a means for applying characters to a page, in this 
way no different from a pen or a typewriter, two earlier forms of the same tool. In the context of human 
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practice though, particularly within practices of the knowledge–intensive variety in modern organisations, 
a word processor is an embedded feature, part of the context of people’s everyday working lives. The 
context of the relationship is described in the instance of Peter’s project by the term ‘authoring’, which 
describes more than just the physical function of placing words on a page, but a specific feature of human 
practice that encapsulates a moral domain as much as it does the physical (Segal, 1999). As Peter 
observed: 
A lady named Sue in HR explained to me that it was unprofessional to give other people access to 
her document until it was finished. She took immense pride in the quality of her work and I could 
see the awards she had received for it on her desk. And she made another good point with me too, 
she said something like “we are encouraged to take ownership of our work, but are then asked to 
jointly produce a piece of work. Where is the ownership or responsibility in that?” She didn’t 
think anyone would care enough to craft their work like her, because they didn’t own it. 
Sue has introduced Peter to the moral domain of the project and how some of it hinges on the word 
‘authoring’ and the implications of craft, responsibility and ownership that go with it (Watson, 1994). In 
Sue’s view of the world, authoring is term of significance for her professional identity that has been 
directly challenged by the new description of ‘multi-authoring’. Sue’s concerns about the intrusion of the 
group into areas previously the sole domain of the individual are echoed by Lanier (2010) who thinks 
“emphasizing the crowd means deemphasizing individual humans in the design of society” (p.154). As 
Peter notes though, not all people shared Sue’s view of this new description: 
For every person we found who hated the new tool, there was somebody who loved it. And it was 
never the one’s you thought either. I mean, usually it’s the older staff, (and I guess that’s me too!) 
who are wary of change, but it’s not always like that. I think it just comes down to whether 
someone can see the possibilities there or not.  
The description of ‘multi-authoring’ is now going through the redescriptive process outlined by Rorty 
and, as Peter demonstrates in his conversation with Sue, it is far more than a simple difference of opinion; 
it speaks to the moral dimension of our practices. In the example of ‘multi-authoring’ the point may arrive 
where the new description gets taken up. This can occur despite the challenge the new description offers 
to the established way of doing things because it opens up new and more interesting possibilities for 
dealing with the world. At this point, the language games that are our practices goes through a process of 
transition where practitioners are divided between those quickly embracing the new descriptions and 
those resisting. Sometimes the new descriptions are accepted and incorporated into our practices. The 
descriptions are then no longer metaphors, but are literally true or, as Rorty puts it, 'dead' metaphors 
(Rorty, 1979). They have, in De Botton’s (2009) words “disappeared from collective consciousness 
through familiarity, becoming as commonplace and unremarkable as a pebble or a cloud.” (p.210)  
De Botton’s point reinforces the Heideggerian observation that our tools eventually become part of our 
background through familiarity (Flores, 2000). The challenge for Peter, as it is for any project manager, is 
the active part a project manager plays in the transition to that familiarity. Rather than waiting for a new 
description to take hold, a project manager is charged with the responsibility for facilitating a transition 
from one kind of description to the next. In the context of ‘multi-authoring’, this means Peter could not 
simply observe the process of transition play out, with the possibility of the new tool being rejected 
completely, but had to engage in the process of bringing the tool into a state of familiarity: 
We had to spend a lot of time with some of the staff. They just had so many problems with the new 
system. It wasn’t a functional thing, they knew how it worked, but they just didn’t want to use it 
because it contradicted a particular view they had of their job. We couldn’t change the system as 
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such, so we had to change their view, make them realize this way the way things were going to be 
and it’d be so much better than it was before.  
The ironist is someone who attempts to redescribe the language game she finds herself in because she 
is unsatisfied with, or has a vested interest in changing, the way she finds it. Rather than accept the 
limitations of the existing vocabulary and therefore the limitations of the world it describes, the ironist 
seeks to provide her own descriptions and challenge those limitations in a direct and active way 
(Bernstein, 1995). Rorty (2007) notes the profound impact (for better or for worse) of some recent 
historical ironists such as Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, who rather than just contributing to debates within 
existing language games, actually altered the context within which socio-political, moral and 
psychological discussion could take place through new descriptions. Peter’s attempt to alter the 
perspective of the end-users in his project is analogous to this as he observes “we couldn’t change the 
system as such, so we had to change their view.” In the ironists view, their new way of thinking is 
something that ought to be shared by everybody (Rorty, 2007).  
Detractors of the ironist have argued that to be "worried" about a final vocabulary implies an objective 
position, that the ironist is comparing the current vocabulary to a potential future vocabulary against 
which the existing one fails to measure up, or what could there be to worry about? (Soper, 2001) Rorty 
claims this misses the point, for there can be no rationale behind the "worry". The ironist is in the process 
of creating the context within which the "worry" may one day make sense and is no more aware of the 
particulars of this future vocabulary than anybody else (Gutting, 1999). That it 'may' one day make sense 
is also important. For every ironist who redescribes our language and invents the terms that we take for 
granted, there are the countless others that suffer marginalisation and obscurity (Rorty, 1989). As Peter 
recounts, challenging the taken-for-granted descriptions that underpin our language games is a fraught 
task, and one that is frequently not successful: 
Initially, we tried to convince people that the new way of working was going to be so much better. 
We hired an external training group to come and show some of the more reluctant adopters of the 
new technology exactly what it was capable of. I remember sitting up the back of one of these 
sessions watching this young guy extol the virtues of the new system, creating new documents with 
some of his colleagues who were video-conferencing in from other countries. It was very cool. 
Trouble was, he kept talking about ‘old ways’ doing things and kept referring to those ways as 
‘dinosaur mode’. He said the new multi-authoring tool was the KT event, which was apparently 
the asteroid that ended the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. Not so cool. The feedback after the 
session was terrible. All the staff felt like they had been insulted.  
The trainer described here effectively gave Peter the opportunity to reflect on the limitations of 
operating in the role of the ironist. Like many an ironist before him, the direct challenge he offered to 
existing final vocabularies was swiftly rebutted, and the redescription failed. Rorty sees this problem as 
an atypical one and “most people just want their language game accepted as it is.” (Rorty, 1979) Change 
is the reason for a project’s existence, but recognising the danger of the revolutionary approach to change 
is a critical element of successful redescription. The alternative Rorty offers to the frequently 
marginalized stance of the ironist is to draw a distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘liberal’ ironism. (Rorty, 
1989) Whilst a strong ironist seeks revolutionary change in the most direct way, a liberal ironist is 
someone who wishes to take advantage of an ironic stance towards our language games, whilst continuing 
to live and work productively in their community. A liberal ironist is simply an ironist who is unwilling to 
be marginalised, and who thinks they can effect the kind of change the strong ironist seeks, but in 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary terms (Bernstein, 2003). The difference between the strong and the 
liberal ironist can be seen in the contrast offered by Angelina, who was responsible for the deployment of 
a new supply chain management system within her airline company’s international freight division. The 
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critical description in question during this project was the term “experience”. Early in the project, 
Angelina observed, experience was understood in the normal sense of the word, i.e. as an experience of 
something. As the project continued however, Angelina saw a shift in the way the term ‘experience’ was 
deployed and noted: 
People no longer talked about experiencing something as an end-user [of technology], they talked 
about ‘the experience’ as if it was something in itself, not about anything in particular anymore, 
but like it was the broadest description possible of the way technology helped everybody with their 
work. And it was really useful too. We could stop trying to define all the little bits of human 
interaction that made up peoples separate experiences of technology, with all those kind of 
inextricable differences, and just talk about ‘the experience’ and what it would deliver to them as 
a group.  
Angelina was not content, however, to allow the new description to gain a place in the organisational 
vocabulary on its own: 
We [the project team] took advantage of everybody talking about ‘the experience’. We started to 
brand ourselves that way, sort of use it as a means to get everybody on the same page. No-one was 
sure exactly what it meant but it just seemed to suggest something better to everyone. I know it 
comes across like one of those dumb marketing buzzwords you hear, but it was funny how it just 
kind of resonated with everyone. People were so desperate for this to work as the IT systems had 
been so bad for so long and we just wanted to feel like we were in an organization that cared 
about us because they cared about the tools we used every day. 
Human consciousness has allowed, Rorty thinks, for the recognition of our "shared capacity to 
experience pain and humiliation" and is a significant element in the construction of a shared language 
(1979:127). In Angelina’s example, this shared capacity has allowed the people associated with her 
project to take part in a new description, one that is yet only half-formed, but ‘resonates’ with all of them 
due to the new descriptions power to alleviate some of the collective pain they are experiencing within an 
organization they feel no longer cares for them. Angelina’s skill in this particular situation is to both 
recognize the beginnings of a new description and then allow and even promote that description to evolve 
within the context of her project: 
It got to the point where we actually started building our strategy around the concept of 
‘experience’ because it was proving so useful. As soon as you mentioned the word in context 
people would be saying ‘oh yeah, that’s the new technology project, we can’t wait’, and we barely 
needed to say anything else. We had been trying to get that kind of attitude amongst the group for 
months with our briefing sessions and communications packs without any success and then 
suddenly, it was on! We then hired a company that specialized in ‘end-user experience’ that were 
incredibly helpful in crafting a rollout strategy based on this idea, which is really weird, because 
the only reason I found them was because we started talking about the project in that way.  
The difference in Angelina’s approach to that of Peter’s trainer is that Angelina utilized a redescription 
that was already there. She did not invent it herself or force it upon staff in the manner of the trainer, but 
had heard staff talking about ‘the experience’ and recognized the possibilities of this new description to 
create a new way of working. Her efforts were then focused around promoting this new description and 
allowing it to be taken up by her customers rather than attempting to conquer existing descriptions as in 
Peter’s project. 
Supply chain management is not sexy. I don’t care what anyone says! But it was a big deal to the 
people responsible for it. The new system was going to change the way they worked but you just 
271 Bradley Rolfe /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  74 ( 2013 )  264 – 273 
had to keep pointing out that it wasn’t going to change how important they were to the company, 
they were still relevant. “The experience” became their way of talking about it, and because it was 
theirs, and I kept making clear it was theirs, it wasn’t being shoved down their throats by 
management, and they felt like they owned the change. It was their baby, I was just the mid-wife.  
Angelina’s approach is at odds with formal project management theory in that it deliberately removes 
the project manager as the central figure of control (Marshall, 2006). Her expression, “it was their baby, I 
was just the mid-wife” captures the perspective of someone who sees themselves as facilitating a creative 
function rather than directing a project to fixed goals (Perrin, 2008). The liberal ironist finds a way to 
avoid the excesses of the revolutionary language of the strong ironist whilst still remaining committed to 
the same ultimate goal, the transformation of their world through transformation of the language games 
that circumscribe it (Rorty, 1999). 
6. Conclusion 
What Rorty's ironism provides project management is a deliberate process by which narratives can be 
altered that does not include the wholesale disruption and/or rejection of existing norms. When that 
happens, to Rorty's way of thinking, violence and cruelty inevitably follow (Rorty, 1999). What is central 
to Rorty's ironism is that it requires the complicity of the users of a language game for it to succeed. The 
ironists, of both the strong and liberal variety, may deploy new metaphors in order to generate a shift in 
the descriptions of their language game, but unless those descriptions are eventually adopted by the 
community at large, they will disappear (Rorty, 1989). In Angelina’s organization, the broader work 
community found a use for the metaphorical innovation of ‘the experience’ that helped them redescribe 
their narrative and deal with their changing reality. Peter’s capacity planning team, by contrast, rejected 
the redescription of ‘multi-authoring’ Peter’s team offered and remained within their existing description. 
Ultimately, what determines the success of a new description in becoming part of our language and our 
beliefs is not the descriptions apparently 'better' correspondence with either the natural world, divine 
revelation or the musings of our 'inner voice', but rather its sheer usefulness (Rorty, 1989). The usefulness 
of the description is determined by how well it integrates with already established terms and whether it 
provide us with more interesting ways of thinking of ourselves. In the Darwinian scheme that Rorty 
borrows, the only metaphors that survive to become 'truths' are the ones that have proved themselves most 
useful in our community for dealing with our reality (Rorty, 1982). A project manager’s function is to 
negotiate that reality, staying attuned to the new ways of describing that are beginning to emerge and 
promoting those that have promise. In the end, a project manager should strive “to see wisdom as 
consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation” and “to see human beings as generators of new 
descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately” (Rorty, 1979:378). 
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